>>74049
D:

While, to be honest, reading necrophilia fanfiction isn't much better than what I did before!

I've went from horrible pictures to horrific writings! I'm progressing, slowly.

#yolo

>>74054

Post your full vn backlog or gtfo

>>73840
>as good as Rewrite was
Little Busters is much better for the most part, except for the routes in Rewrite written by Romeo of course.
>Koihime Musou and Shuffle.
why would you do that. just drop Shuffle and watch the anime instead, seriously.

actually, put everything on hold and read Cross Channel instead. after that go read a bunch of Liar-Soft VNs. also play Rance.

>>73840
Uhm, welcome! New faces are nice considering the place is pretty dead.

Aah, i missed the meeting of new person.
>>73812
Hi, nice to be met meet you.
As it was said before, this place's activity is actually not much big. But of course that doesn't mean that there is actually no one here.
>>73838
Well, it actaully does look that way for now. As well as in my case, though.

Reduction of natural advantages through adherence to moral obligations is compensated by acceptance into societies. The advantages of an aid network comprised of an extremely large number of people outweigh the costs of not taking advantage of superior amoral opportunities. Overall, people who are part of a society have an advantage over people who aren't. Moreover, people who take amoral actions in the presence of a society face costly feedback from that society that often outweigh the advantages in the first place.

In short, a murderer who killed someone for their wallet is less likely to survive than somebody who spends their own money to bake cookies for everyone in the neighborhood.

This is ultimately a fancier variant of the Ship of Theseus problem, which is only a problem inasmuch as it leads us to question the very nature of authenticity. A human body isn't comparable to the Ship of Theseus though; there is a very high chance that most or all of your cells are different than they were when you were born. Having all of your cells replaced with a bunch of new ones instantaneously shouldn't matter. There is nothing inherently "you" about the cells that comprise you, just their composition.

But I think the real question people are struggling with in this sort of example is one of consciousness and self. But we have to ask: What are "you?" Are you really anything more than a perception of continuous consciousness? Are you the same person you were 5 years ago? 10 years ago? Do you have the same desires and thoughts? Is the experience useless to you if it's nothing more than an implanted memory that never happened? How can you be sure your memories aren't? What if you got a traumatic head injury like Phineas Gage, whom friends said acted like a different man afterward?

My argument here would be that E-Prime and E-Uranus are different people, but both are E and indeed both were the same E up until the moment both regained (or gained) consciousness. Same memories, same pattern, same existence up to that point so far as their consciousness is concerned. After that point, there are now two people, one of whom is on Earth and has a fatal condition and another who is on Uranus and does not. Giving it any more thought than that necessitates involving unprovable entities. We can demonstrably prove there are two Es, but they diverge in consciousness thereafter and become distinct individuals. Experience of consciousness determines sense of self. You are "yourself" only inasmuch as you appear to think you are.

The only reason this is weird to you is because it sounds weird when you make a brain teaser out of it, in much the same way being afraid of a teleporter sounds weird to someone who isn't used to it. Yes, it kills you and reconstitutes you physically in another location. What of it? You don't notice;

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>>73743

This has nothing to do with the ship of theseus problem since the materials of the two people have nothing to do with each other, only the information about the structure. You do notice being killed but you don't notice being reconstituted because that copy is a distinct instance of yourself and your consciousness doesn't magically transfer to it. Even if sleep turned out to be the same it'd just mean that death in general is extremely commonplace, not that it's not something to worry about.

>>73738
It's not a hypothetical variant of death, it's just regular death but a clone pops out afterwards.
>and this particular case has literally none of the negatives that normal death has.
You missed the somewhat important part where this only applies to everyone except the guy who just exploded in the teleporter. From your perspective, you've just committed suicide. Congratulations, you are dead. Very much and truly so.
It's only to everyone besides yourself that someone who looks and acts exactly like you continues to exist.

If you ask me, I wouldn't ever use the teleporter in the first place. I don't really feel like killing myself every time I want to get from point A to B, no matter how convenient it may be in video games where you just revive at the church or in front of the king whenever you die.
On the other hand, if other people wanted to use it, I'd say "go right ahead, makes no difference to me". It'd be a ridiculously useful mode of transport for objects or even people, so I say go ahead and build thousands of the things; just don't ever put me anywhere near one of them.

Not to mention the completion of such a machine would first require the technology for flawlessly perfect and instantaneous cloning, which if you ask me would be a much more impressive and scientifically beneficial thing than simply being able to move from one place to another very quickly.

>>73744
It's similar to the objection being made that the other being isn't you, in the same sense a fully-replaced ship is no longer the same ship. Except it is, because there's continuity. For a vessel it's the continuity of identification; for an individual it's the appearance of continuity of consciousness, which is philosophically no different from actual continuity of consciousness.

>>73745
There is no "from your perspective" of the dead original, because they're dead and their perspective ceases at the exact moment the new perspective resumes. The only way perspective can continue is in the case of the copying variant, which simply produces two "yous" that diverge immediately into two distinct individuals who share the same history.

In the case of the transportation instead of duplication, "you" continue to exist without noticing any difference. The appearance of continuity is impossible to notice, only to rationalize intellectually. It is true that the individual biological construct that is your original goes in and dies, but that doesn't matter. "You" are your consciousness. If you suffered irreversible amnesia, you wouldn't be "you" anymore; the loss of your consciousness is functionally equivalent to death. But if you woke up one day in a robot body, you'd probably argue that you were "still you," even though clearly something happened to your biological body. You can replace what constitutes you as long as your consciousness believes it remains the same.

After all, there's no way to know you weren't created by a duplication process this morning that destroyed the body that went to sleep in your best last night. There's no way to know the universe existed five minutes ago. "You" are perception and consciousness, and as long as a "you"

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>>73587
Hey that's pretty cool, that was coded in sublimetext. I knew you could add backgrounds, but that's a cool idea.

Last edited at 13/08/28(Wed)16:13:10

>>73591
waaat